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Evidence ":c~ne~· I Clergy Privilege 
A (different kind of) Fathers' Day column 
Montana's clergy privilege "Bless me, Father, for. • • 
II 
By Cynthia Ford 
This column deals with the application of Montana's clergy 
privilege. We have already covered privileges in general, and 
the spousal (yes) and parent-child (no) privileges specifically. 
Montana's privileges are statutory, and the statutes are construed 
narrowly to accommodate the competing public interest in full 
disclosure of relevant information. 
The basic purpose for all privileges is to foster certain speci-
fied relationships: 
26-1-801. Policy to protect confidentiality in 
certain relations. There are particular relations 
in which it is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, 
a person cannot be examined as a witness in the 
cases enumerated in this part. 
The third of the thirteen specific privilege statutes in 
Montana protects certain religious communications: 
26-1-804. Confessions made to member 
of clergy. A member of the clergy or priest may 
not, without the consent of the person making the 
confession, be examined as to any confession made 
to the individual in the individual's professional 
character in the course of discipline enjoined by 
the church to which the individual belongs. 
This statute was first enacted in 1867; its last amendment was 
in 20091, as part of a gender-neutralization bill. 
In the 147 years of its history, the Montana Supreme Court 
has construed this statute in only two cases, one in 1998 and the 
other in 1999. (Both were criminal cases in which the defendants 
were convicted of sexual abuse of their respective stepdaughters.) 
The Court recognized two different approaches to this privilege 
in other states, and chose to adopt the broader (Utah2), rather 
1 History: En. Secs. 373-377, pp. 21 o, 211 , L. 1867; re-en. Secs. 447-4S1, p. 125, Cod. 
Stat. 1871 ; en. Secs. 629, 630, pp. 203, 204, L. 1877; re-en. Secs. 629, 630, 1st Div. Rev. 
Stat. 1879; re-en. Secs. 650, 651, 1st Div. Comp. Stat. 1887; re-en. Sec. 3163, C. Civ. 
Proc. 1895; re-en. Sec. 7892, Rev. C. 1907; re-en. Sec. 10536, R.C.M. 1921 ; amd. Sec. 
1, Ch. 83, l. 1925; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 130, L. 1931; re-en. Sec. 10536, R.C.M. 1935; amd. 
Sec. 1, Ch. 61, l. 1971; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 318, L. 1973; amd. Sec. 15, Ch. 543, L. 1 975; 
amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 225, l. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 93-701-4(3); amd. Sec. 532, Ch. 56, l. 2009. 
2 In Smtt v. Hammock (Utah 1994), 870 P.Zd 947. the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the defendanrs disclosures about his sexual conduct with hi.s adopted daugh-
~e~, made to the bishop of his local stake of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
at;ts, ~s privileged, even though LOS bishops a re lay mem bers of the Church, 
;rl~I% 1 e ~ ordal~ed. I commend this case to you for Its In-depth history of the 
the Ni! W e~lnnmg In Pre-Reformation In Olde Englande and tracing Its journey to 
10 all for orfd, as well as Its lengthy d iscussion of the need to extend the privilege ms o re liglor1. 
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than the narrower (W ashington3) as a matter of public policy 
and freedom of religion. In both cases, however, the Court af-
firmed the trial judge's refusal to apply the statute and held the 
communications to be non-privileged and admissible even on 
the broader interpretation of the statute. These cases teach sev-
eral lessons about how to maximize your chance of successfully 
invoking the clergy privilege at trial. 
STATE V. MACKINNON (1998) 
The Supreme Court's first encounter with the clergy privilege 
occurred when defendant Mackinnon's asserted the clergy-peni-
tent privilege as to two conversations and a related document in 
which he confessed to the unlawful sexual conduct with which 
he had been charged. The Supreme Court observed: 
,- 21 Enacted in 1867, § 26-1-804, MCA, was left 
unchanged by the adoption of the Montana Rules 
of Evidence. See Commission Comments to Article 
V: Privileges, M.R.Evid. 
Despite this statute's long history, we are presented 
for the first time with an issue involving its 
application. In considering the application of this 
statute, we note that the United States Supreme 
Court has explained: 
Testimonial exclusionary rules and 
privileges contravene the fundamental 
principle that " 'the public ... has a right to 
every man's evidence.' " As such, they must 
be strictly construed and accepted "only 
to the very limited extent that permitting 
a refusal to testify or excluding relevant 
evidence has a public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing 
all rational means for ascertaining truth. 
CLERGY PRIVILEGE, next page 
3 In State v. Buss, 76 Wash.App. 780, 887 P.2d 920 (1995), the Washington Court of 
Appeals refused to apply the privilege, holding that the non-ordained "family min-
ister" at the parishioner's Catholic Church was not a "member of the clergy" within 
the language of a privilege statute very similar to Montana's. Further, "La Moria did 
not administer the Catholic sacrament of confession in the narrow, ecclesiastical 
sense. A narrow reading of"confession" or "course of discipline" includes only the 
sacrament of confession, which did not occur. Montana's refusal to follow this ap-
proach was later validated by the Washington Supreme Court (en bane) in State v. 
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Trammel v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 
100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195 (citations 
omitted). Additionally, we note that interpretations 
in other jurisdictions of clergy-penitent statutes 
similar to § 26-1-804, MCA, have varied. See e.g. 
State v. Buss (1995), 76 Wash.App. 780, 887 P.2d 
920, and Scott v. Hammock (Utah 1994), 870 P.2d 
947. 
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329, 
336-37, 957 P.2d 23, 27. 
The Court went on to discuss the differing approaches of our 
sister states, and concluded: 
,- 24 Notwithstanding that testimonial exclusionary 
rules and privileges are strictly construed and 
accepted, Trammel, ... under the federal First 
Amendment and under Article II, Section 5 of the 
Montana Constitution, all persons are guaranteed 
the free exercise of their religious beliefs and all 
religions are guaranteed governmental neutrality. 
See, for example, Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), 367 
U.S. 488, 495, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 1683-84, 6 L.Ed.2d 
982, 987; and Rasmussen v. Bennett{l987), 228 
Mont. 106, 111-12, 741P.2d755, 758-59. Thus, 
in order to minimize the risk that § 26-1-804, 
MCA, might be discriminatorily applied because 
of differing judicial perceptions of a given church's 
practices or religious doctrine, and in order to 
least interfere with the federal and Montana 
constitutional protections of religious freedom 
referred to above, we conclude that Utah's broader 
interpretation of the clergy-penitent privilege as set 
forth in Scott, 870 P.2d 947, is the better view, and 
we adopt that approach. 
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329, 
337-38, 957 P.2d 23, 28. 
Thus, the Court, without being as direct as I am about to be, 
set the stage for application of this privilege to many different 
religions. 
Here's my4 less politic restatement: The privilege was first 
developed for traditional hierarchal churches with clear demar-
cation between clergy and lay workers. The obvious archetype 
is the Catholic confessional, with secret confession and absolu-
tion in a private booth housing only the priest and the penitent: 
"''Bless me Father for I have sinned. My last confession was ... 
Since that confession, I have sinned by ... " If the communica-
tion was in the confessional, by a member of the congregation to 
a robed priest ordained by the Catholic church, it was protected 
from compelled testimony. It turns out, of course, that there 
4 To help the reader account for my editorial biases ahd errors, I disclose that 
when I do go to church, it Is to the very well-recognized and formally organized 
Episcopal Church. "We" don't do regular Individual confessions, although we do 
stand as a group and make a general confession acknowledging unspecified errors 
and omissions (Including the "sin of bad taste") and asking for general forgiveness. 
I believe this Is referred to in some circles as "Catholic ilte."When congregation 
members do have Individual meetings for the purpose of spiritual counseling, it Is 
easy to tell who Is "clergy" and who Is not. 
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are a multitude of religious approaches, with varying degrees of 
formality and confession/absolution models. 111e constitutional 
right to freedom of religion means that the clergy privilege ap-
plies to religions way outside of the mainstream5, bu t if and only 
if they meet the implied requirements of the statute. 
The church involved in the Mackinnon case was called the 
Missoula Christian Church, an offshoot of a similar church 
in Denver. Three of the' witnesses the State sought to call at 
trial moved to Montana to form the church, and had on-going 
responsibilities as group leaders, but were not ordained. In his 
attempt to use the clergy privilege, the defendant put on specific 
evidence about the beliefs of the church: 
[T]he Church is headed by an ordained minster 
who conducts church services and is licensed to 
perform marriages. As a part of its Bible-based 
teachings, the Church allows its members to 
confess their sins to one another, but no church 
member has the authority to formally forgive sins. 
Rather, the Church believes forgiveness only comes 
from God. 
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329, 
332, 957 P.2d 23, 25. 
Mackinnon's wife became active in this church first, be-
fore Mackinnon was charged and pled not guilty to the sexual 
abuse of her 9-year-old daughter. She divorced Mackinnon in 
May, and became a member of the church in June. Mackinnon 
himself became active in the church at some point but did not 
become a member until October. (These dates matter). The 
two conversations at issues took place in July and August, both 
before Mackinnon had formally joined the church. 
The allegedly privileged communications involved the defen-
dant, his ex-wife, the child victim, and the church leadersr(John 
and Coleen Contos and Ken Edwards), but not during a church 
service per se: 
On July 16, 1995, after an evening church ser-
vice conducted in a Missoula restaurant, which 
both Monica and MacKinnon had attended, 
Monica and M.G. encountered MacKinnon in 
the parking lot. An argument ensued concerning 
visitation of Monica's and MacKinnon's two boys. 
Thereafter, MacKinnon began talking to M.G. and 
apologizing to her6, apparently to set things right 
with her so she would not have to testify at court 
proceedings. Concerned with the nature of this 
conversation, Monica suggested that they continue 
the conversation inside the restaurant in the pres-
ence ofJohn and Coleen Contos. As a result of 
CLERGY PRIVILEGE, next page 
5 Otherwise known as •wacko.• But, as I often tell my class, they might be right 
and by the time we figure that out, It will be too fate .· · 
6 Montana does have an "apology" privilege, MCA 26-~·814, enacted in 2005, 
but It applies only In civil actions for medical malpractice. 1 will spend another 
column examining apology privi leges around the country, to see wh~the.r .we . 
should improve Montana's emotional climate-and p~rhaps reduce its ht1ga t1on 
h r types of claims. For sure Mackinnon load- by extending tllis privilege to ot e • 
was not the victim's doctor ... 
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Monica's suggestion, the conversation continued 
in the back of the lobby area of the restaurant 
with everyone sitting on chairs. Subsequently, 
on August 21, 1995, a second conversation 
took place at the home of John Contos involv-
ing MacKinnon, Monica, John Contos and Ken 
Edwards. 
288 Mont. at 332-33, 957 P.2d at 25. 
The defendant moved in limine to exclude reference to these 
conversations, as well as to an associated document. The judge 
took testimony of the "churchliness" [my word] of the commu-
nications, and eventually split the baby, barring the document 
and the August conversation but allowing four witnesses (the 
ex-wife, the victim, and the Contos church leader couple) to 
testify as to Mackinnon's July statements. 
On appeal, Mackinnon urged the Supreme Court to hold the 
July conversation privileged: 
He asserts that testimony given by John and 
Coleen Contos was inadmissible under § 26-
1-804, MCA, because the Contoses, in their 
professional character as clergy persons, and 
in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
Church, heard him confess the ~rime with which 
he had been charged two months previously. 
Additionally, MacKinnon asserts that Monica 
and M.G. should not have been allowed to testify 
about his statements because the July conversation 
was analogous to compromise negotiations and 
conciliation counseling. Furthermore, MacKinnon 
contends that because of the religious setting, 
he trusted that his statements would be kept 
confidential. Ultimately, MacKinnon claims that 
Monica coerced and tricked him into confessing. 
288 Mont. at 336, 957 P.2d at 27. The Supreme 
Court rejected every one of these arguments. 
At the same time that the Court endorsed a broad view of \ 
the clergy privilege, it found that even under that broad view, 
Mackinnon's conversation with his ex-wife, stepdaughter, and 
two church leaders did not qualify. First, the Court seemed 
dubious but accepted Judge Larson's assumption that the 
Contoses were "clergy." However, it noted that Mackinnon 
was not yet a member of the church nor had he ever sought any 
spiritual guidance from either Contos. Most importantly, 
MacKinnon did not ask to meet with John and 
Coleen Contos for the purpose of confession or 
for religious guidance, counseling, admonishment 
or advice. Rather, Monica requested that John 
and Coleen Contos be present during the July 
conversation, but only to serve as facilitators. 
Moreover, during the July conversation, 
MacKinnon did not ask for, and the Contoses did 
not give, any spiritual advice or forgiveness. No 
prayers were given and nothing was said about 
Pagel6 
forgiveness. Rather, MacKinnon volunteered his 
statements without apparent encouragement in 
order to set things right with his stepdaughter, 
M.G., so that she would not have to testify at 
court proceedings. In this regard, MacKinnon's 
statements were directed at Monica and M.G., 
not the Contoses'. Finally, MacKinnon had 
no reasonable expectation that his statements 
would be held in confidence. MacKinnon did 
not seek and the Contoses did not make any 
representations of confidentiality. Instead, 
MacKinnon made his statements in a public place 
to his ex-wife and stepdaughter in the presence of 
the Contoses. 
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 
329, 339, 957 P.2d 23, 28-29. 
The Montana Supreme Court held that, under these circum-
stances, the clergy privilege was not implicated, even on a very 
broad reading. There was no error in admitting any of the tes-
timony about this "confession" made in the presence of church 
leaders. On the other hand, Judge Larson did exclude evidence 
of the other conversation, in which the defendant went to the 
church leaders' home and met with them; the Supreme Court 
did not criticize this ruling (because the defendant, obviously, 
did not). I would call this case 50/50: the defendant won half of 
his motion at trial, and lost half. The Supreme Court's decision 
affirmed his defeat as to 50% of his claimed privilege. 
STATE V. GOODING (1999) 
Rocky Brian Gooding was charged with sexual misconduct 
towards his young stepdaughter, G.T .. The abuse occurred in 
Libby, Montana, while the mother was at work and the stepfa-
ther stayed at home with the victim and three other children. 
The family moved to Spokane, Washington, in 1990 and began 
attending the Sunrise Church of Christ. 
In approximately March 1993 Gooding began 
confiding with two members of the church, 
Gerald and Tina Glover, about prior acts of 
sexual molestation with G.T. At the time of these 
meetings, Gerald Glover was a nonordained 
deacon in charge of the church's food and 
clothing bank. Tina Glover, Gerald Glover's wife, 
did not hold an official church position. 
,- 7 The first meeting between Gerald Glover and 
Gooding occurred at the church. Gooding sought 
the help of a junior minister and Gerald Glover 
sat in on their meeting. In the following months, 
Gooding met with Gerald and Tina Glover in their 
home to discuss his problems associated with his 
conduct toward his stepdaughter. Gerald and Tina 
were both present for some of these meetings. 
However, Gooding would talk to Tina alone when 
Gerald wasn't available. 
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'"8 In December 1994 Detective D.A. Routt 
of the Spokane County Sheriffs Department 
interviewed Gerald and Tina Glover during an 
investigation into Gooding's relationship with his 
stepdaughter. The Glovers informed Detective 
Routt that Gooding had revealed to them that he 
had sexually molested his stepdaughter while in 
Montana. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
236, 989 P.2d 304, 306. 
The Washington detective forwarded this information to 
Montana authorities, who prosecuted Gooding in Lincoln 
County. 
Prior to trial, the State added the Glovers to its witness list. 
Because they were in Washington, the State also filed a notice of 
intent to depose both Gerald and Tina Glover. After the deposi-
tions, the defendant moved to exclude the depositions from 
trial on the basis of the clergy-penitent privilege. 
Gooding' s affidavit in support of the motion in limine stated 
that "he considered Gerald Glover to be "a representative of 
my church and my spiritual adviser" (but did not say anything 
about Tina Glover). The Glovers' deposition testimony was 
split: "while Gerald Glover testified in his deposition that 
Gooding approached him as 'somebody to lean on ... to talk to 
and confess out [his] sins,' Tina Glover testified that Gooding 
approached the Glovers because 'he was concerned about his 
conduct and about going to jail.' 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 240, 989 
P.2d 304, 308. 
The trial judge denied the motion, specifically finding that 
neither Tina nor Gerald met the standard of the statute. 
The court ruled that Gooding's initial statements to Gerald 
and a junior minister were not privileged under § 26-1-804, 
MCA, because Gerald was simply "a bystander." The court also 
ruled that, given the evidence presented, Gooding's statements 
to Gerald or Tina were not privileged because neither Gerald 
nor Tina met the requirements of the statute. Lastly, the court 
noted that Tina was "a bystander" when Gooding first came to 
her house to talk with Gerald. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 238, 989 
P.2d 304, 307. 
At trial, the State strategically submitted only the deposition 
testimony of Tina (not Gerald). Gooding was convicted and 
appealed. 
Gooding asserts that his statements to Gerald and 
Tina Glover were inadmissible under § 26-1-804, 
MCA, because he considered Gerald Glover to 
be a representative of his church and a spiritual 
advisor and he believed conversations held at the 
Glovers' house would be kept confidential. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
238, 989 P.2d 304, 307. 
The Supreme Court began with its standard statement in 
privilege cases: 
www.montanabar.org 
'" 16 Initially, we observe that testimonial 
privileges must be strictly construed because 
they contravene the fundamental principle that 
the public has the right to everyone's evidence. 
See MacKinnon, '"21 (citing Trammel v. United 
States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 
63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195). 
State v. Goodinc,•1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
238, 989 P.2d 304, 307. The Court refused to 
discuss the ruling as to Gerald's deposition 
because the State chose not to offer that evidence. 
With regard to Tina's deposition, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court that Tina was not a member of the clergy 
within the meaning of the statute, under any conceivable defini-
tion of that term: 
'"21 Although we have never clarified the 
definition of"clergy" under§ 26-1-804, MCA, 
nothing in the record suggests that Tina Glover 
was a clergy person. Tina testified that she was not 
a minister, clergyman, or deacon of the Sunrise 
Church of Christ. She stated that the church 
does not ordain women. She also stated that she 
did not have any special counseling role within 
the church. Therefore, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting statements 
Gooding made to Tina Glover .... 
Tina was acting as an ordinary confidant rather 
than as a clergy person. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
240, 989 P.2d 304, 308. 
The fact that Tina herself was not a member of the clergy of 
the Sunrise Church of Christ disqualified not only the state-
ments Gooding made to her, but also those statements he made 
to her husband (even if Gerald were a clergyman) in Tina's 
presence: 
'"22 Gooding's statements to Gerald in Tina's 
presence were not privileged as to Tina, even if we 
were to conclude that Gerald met the definition 
of clergy. Section 26-1-804, MCA, states that 
"a clergyman or priest cannot ... be examined as 
to confessions made to him." The statute clearly 
creates a testimonial privilege for a "clergyman 
or priest"; the statute does not expressly create 
a testimonial privilege for a nonclerical church 
member for statements made in his or her 
presence. In interpreting a statute, we cannot add 
what has been omitted. See§ 1-2-101, MCA. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
240, 989 P.2d 304, 308. 
Con:fi<lentiality is key to all the privile~es, in~uding this one. 
Disclosw·es made between parties to a privilege'. m the presence 
of a person not in the statutorily protected relationship, are not 
privileged. 
CLERGY PRIVILEGE, next page 
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Lastly, the Court found the defendant's evidence on the 
Sunrise Church and its organization and beliefs to be deficient: 
[T]here is no factual record to support a finding 
that these statements were made pursuant to the 
practices and discipline of the Sunrise Church 
of Christ. Even if we had concluded that either 
Gerald or Tina Glover was a member of the clergy 
for purposes of the clergy-penitent privilege, the 
evidence presented to the District Court did not 
indicate that these admissions were made "in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the church." See§ 
26-1-804, MCA. 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 
240-41, 989 P.2d 304, 308. 
Thus, the clergy privilege did not cover Tina's testimony.7 
The Gooding jury heard, properly, Tina's testimony both about 
what Gooding said to her when they were alone, and what he 
said to her husband when the three of them were together . lb.is 
case was a complete loss for the defendant. 
SCORECARD 
Almost 150 years after the Montana legislature first enacted 
a priv.ilege for confidential communications between a clergy 
person and a congregant, the two reported Montana Supreme 
Court cases about it demonstrate only a 258% success rate 
in seeking its protection. I do not think this means that the 
clergy privilege is unusable, however. I bet that there are lots of 
unreported trial court cases in which the privilege was asserted 
and granted, alleviating any discussion at the appellate level. 
These probably are easy cases, where the confessing person was 
a member of a formal church, the person to whom she disclosed 
her wrongdoing had a formal rank, and the tenet of the religion 
encouraged spiritual counseling by that priest/minister/rabbi/ 
monk. Even though the Montana Supreme Court has signaled 
its willingness to extend the privilege to a wide variety of tradi-
tions and roles, those at the fringes make it harder to prove that 
the statutory requisites have been met. 
LESSONS FROM THE CASES 
A. Start with the big policy arguments. 
As with all privileges, it is important to start with the legisla-
tive finding that the relationship between the communicants is 
both socially valuable and dependent on confidentiality. The 
plain language version of this argument: It is good for a per-
son's spiritual and mental health to be able to obtain religious 
guidance; that guidance can only occur when the person is ab-
solutely honest with the religious leader; the person will only b 
absolutely honest when she knows that her statements will be 
kept secret. Thus, in order for the public to b,e able to improve 
the spiritual and mental health of individual members, inur-
ing to the benefit of all, a person must be able to confide in her 
7 
It alhso observed that, If there had been error, It was harmless in light of the 
overw elming evidence of guilt apart from Ms. Glove~. 
8 Mackinnonwon•L fh 
"o Is argument.; Gooding won none. 
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religious leader. 
A person asserting the clergy privilege ·hould make two 
additional arguments: first, that a · a matter of publi policy, Lhe 
M nlana Sup1·cme Court has hdd th<ll' the privi lege should be 
be adly nstrued, citing Mackinnon. lhe second argument i 
based on the constitutional freedom of religion (also recognized 
in Maclci nn n): "Because most clmrd1es do n t s t aside forma l 
occasions for special private encounters labeled 'confession,' 
less formal consultation must be privileged if the privilege is 
not in effect to be limited to Roman Catholics." Mary Harter 
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?, 71 Minn.L.Rev. 723, 748 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
B. Present affirmative evidence on all of the requirements 
of the statute. 
The statute's exacl wording is crucial. Here it i again: " Ll] 
A member of the clergy or priest may .not, without th consent of 
the person making the confession, be exami.ned as to any con-
fmlon made to the individual [2] in the individual's professionr.11 
character in the [4] course of discipline enjoined by tlte chur h to 
which [ 3] the individual belongs." 
1. Prove that the person to whom the "confession" was 
made should, in fact, be considered "a member of the 
clergy or priest." 
This is easy in a formal religion which sets out requirements 
such as ordination. If a degree from a seminary is involved, en-
ter it into evidence. If there has been an ordination ceremony, 
have the clergy person discuss that. If there is an employment 
contract from the church, setting out a job title, introduce that. 
If the clergy person wears a distinguishing article of clothing, 
such as a collar, have her wear that to the hearing and explain 
its significance to the court. Of course, the opponent to the 
privilege can also seek this information. In Gooding, Tina 
herself sounded the death knell for application of the privilege 
for the statements made to her: "Tina testified that she was 
- not a minister, clergyman, or deacon of the Sunrise Church of 
Christ." Game, set match ... 
You can still succeed on this leg of your argument if your 
client made the disclosure to a less traditional cleric, but you 
have to be more creative, and more persuasive. Mackinnon 
and Gooding both indicate that the Court is willing to stretch, 
maybe a lot, but can't/won't do so unless counsel creates a suf-
ficient record. Maybe the simplest way to do this factually is to 
simply ask the clergy person: "Are you a clergy person? What 
makes you a clergy person?" The witness' own understanding 
as to bis role is critical. 
Another useful route is to adduce evidence from another 
official of the church, explaining both the appointment and 
functions of the type of church worker who heard the confes-
sion, as well a "the course of discipline" of the church. This is 
exactly what convinced the Supreme Court of Utah, in Scott v. 
Hammock, di cussed in fn. 2, to extend the privilege to com-
munications made to the non-ordained bishop of the local stake 
of the LDS Church. 
As a legal argument, you should research other states' privi-
lege cases to see and cite any which deal with the same religion 
and same type of clergy in that religion. If other jurisdictions 
CLERGY PRIVILEGE, next page 
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have extended privilege to this type of disclosure to this type of 
person, Montana may follow suit. Thus, although Montana has 
not yet decided a clergy privilege case involving the Mormon 
Church, the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the Hammock case 
should be highly persuasive. 
2. Prove that, at the time of the communication, the clergy 
person was acting "in his professional character." This 
is what went wrong for Mackinnon. The Court, with-
out specifically ruling that the Contoses were clergy, 
held that even if they were as a general matter, the 
circumstances of the disputed conversation showed 
that that night they were acting more as a protector 
of Mackinnon's ex-wife: "the other facts surround-
ing the July conversation indicate that any statements 
MacKinnon made were not directed at John and Coleen 
Contos in their 'professional character,' that is, in their 
capacities as clerics or in their religious roles." Similarly, 
in the Gooding case, the confidante characterized herself 
as just that: an ordinary confidante (not privileged) 
rather than a clergy person (privileged). 
In the perfect world, your client would have prefaced any 
conversation with "I would like to talk to you in your role as 
a clergy person, to whom I will confess my conduct in order 
to receive spiritual guidance and perhaps absolution." "Bless 
me, Father, for I have sinned ... " of course will do nicely. In 
the same ideal universe, the privileged conversation would 
have occurred in a church, best of all in a confessional booth. 
Obviously, however, bricks and mortar and a religious sym-
bol such as a cross or altar are not required. In Mackinnon, 
Judge Larson protected a conversation which occurred at the 
Condoses' home; it is the substance of the communication, not 
its location, which fulfills this requirement. 
In the world in which we really live, you will have to get l 
both your client and the "clergy" person to testify that they un-
derstood something like this to be happening, even if it wasn't 
articulated per se. Again, I am a big proponent of just asking: 
"At the time of the conversation with defendant, were you 
acting in your professional character as a clergy person? What 
makes you say that? Even though you met in a coffee shop, not 
a church? Doesn't that matter? Why not?" 
3. Prove that the person making the confession "belongs" 
to the church. 
Again, for some religions this is easy. There may be 
baptismal, confirmation or other membership records. In 
Mackinnon, although the Court did not discuss how it made the 
distinction, it observed that Mackinnon became "active" in the 
church after June but did not "join" the church until October 
(coincidental that this was the same month in which he went 
to trial and claimed the privilege?); the communication at issue 
was in July. The timing was better for Gooding: although there 
was no "membership" date, it appeared that the whole fam-
ily had been attending the church for about three years before 
the confession occurred. The Court appeared to accept that 
Gooding belonged to the church, but was highly skeptical of 
this for Mackinnon. The simplistic questions here, for both 
www.montanabar.org 
clergy and the person confessing, are: "Do you/does she belong 
to the church? What makes you say so? Did you/she belong to 
the church on the date of the confession?" 
4. Prove that "the confession ... was made in the course of 
discipline enjoined by [that] church." Defense counsel 
in Mackinnon did a good job on this point during the 
argument in limine: 
Specifically, the District Court heard testimony concerning 
the status ofJohn Contos, Coleen Contos and Ken Edwards 
within the Missoula Christian Church, the structure and disci-
pline of the Church, as well as the circumstances sm;rounding 
the July and August conversations. 
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329, 335, 957 
P.2d 23, 27. 
By contrast, the Supreme Court faulted counsel in Gooding 
for failing to address this requirement: "[T]here is no factual 
record to support a finding that these statements were made 
pursuant to the practices and discipline of the Sunrise Church 
of Christ." State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 240-
41, 989 P.2d 304, 308. 
In the Utah case discussed above, the church itself moved to 
quash the subpoena issued to it, and so had the opportunity to 
put on its own evidence about its beliefs: 
The LDS Church and Hammock argue that 
a broader construction is necessary to avoid 
discriminating against religious denominations 
that do not require formal confessions, but 
whose doctrine and practice require their clerics 
to provide confidential spiritual counseling, 
guidance, and advice to their parishioners. The 
LDS Church points out that many religious 
denominations, including a number of Protestant 
churches, teach that admission of wrongdoing 
is an important part of their religious doctrine 
and practice, but have no formal requirement for 
making admissions of wrongdoing to a cleric. In 
addition, the LDS Church argues that whether or 
not formal penitential confessions are required by 
a denomination, the role of a cleric in providing 
spiritual guidance and counseling cannot properly 
be limited to formal confessions and the law ought 
to recognize that fact. With respect to its own 
doctrine and practice, the LDS Church states that 
its members are required to engage in a process 
of repentance by which confidential admissions 
of wrongdoing may be made to a bishop or stake 
president at the beginning, during, or at the ~nd 
of the repentance process and that confidential 
nonpenitential communications between a 
bishop or stake president and members of the 
LDS Church are an essential part of that process. 
Indeed, the LDS Church asserts that a_ccording 
to its course of discipline. it is ltnpossi~le ~o 
separate a specific "penitential onfession from 
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the process of providing religious and spiritual 
counseling, guidance, and admonishment 
intended to persuade a church member to forsake 
and make amends for wrongful conduct. 
Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 951(Utah1994). The 
lesson here is to be as specific as possible about the practices of 
the church at issue, focusing on the spiritual importance of con-
fidential communications and counseling in that religion. The 
best way to do that is to move in limine, and to call as witnesses 
at the pretrial hearing not just the church person to whom the 
disclosure was made but also a higher-ranking church official 
who can speak generally about church doctrine, practices, and 
personnel. 
CONCLUSION 
Confession may be good for the soul, but unless it is done in 
accordance with the privilege statute, may cost the penitent his 
physical liberty or wofldly possessions. All religious confes-
sions qualify for the privilege, but having a confidant does not. 
The devil is in the details. 
' 
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches civil procedure, evidence, family law, and remedies. 
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